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## NATIONAL SENTIMENTS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD MINORITIES

### **Introduction**

There are numerous investigational approaches to the phenomenon of Nationalism in the relevant literature of political science, international relations or sociology, all dealing with various aspects of the problem. Conceptualisations of nationalism cover aspects of political ideology and political movement as well as the process of nation-building and also the particular political orientation of individuals.

#### *Purpose of the study*

The purpose of the work presented in this paper was to examine the structure of attitudes organised around the notion of the nation and explore the structural relationship between national sentiments and attitudes toward cohabitant minority groups connected to the concept of nation. The present work is an attempt to study the structure and interrelatedness of attitudes toward one's own dominant national group and attitudinal strategies toward cohabitant minority groups.

Among the few empirical investigations focused on nationalism as a political orientation the work of H. Dekker and D. Malova (1997) stands out. According to their approach national attitudes can be conceptualized as a set of attitudes toward one's people and country, differing in strength and affect. Nationalism is merely one of the component attitudes of the set. Empirical research has shown that the component attitudes of the model (National Feeling, National Liking, National Pride, National Preference, National Superiority and Nationalism) are discrete sentiments organised into a cumulative hierarchy.

Although this model is focused on attitudes related to the concept of the nation, it is plausible that these attitudes are closely connected to opinions about issues concerning the relationship between the national majority and minority groups. Therefore, the aim of the present work was twofold. First, we set out to test the Dekker–Malova model on a Hungarian sample, to show that in spite of the fact that the applied scale contains several items with highly country-specific connotations the model itself is valid in the Hungarian context as well. The second aim was to reveal the structural relationships between the above mentioned national attitudes of the model and certain attitudes toward minority groups.

## *Definitions and Hypotheses*

Historians, sociologist, political scientists and social psychologists have proposed several definitions for the concept of a „minority”. One approach is to find relatively objective, observable criteria, analysing cultural, historical or physical characteristics (see e.g. Kővágó 1983) emphasizing the numerical disadvantage of the minority group. Other definitions (see e.g. Wagley and Harris, quoted by Simpson and Yinger 1985: 17) are less concerned with objective differences but include aspects of minority existence, which arise from the disadvantageous social position of minorities, from the majority-minority relations and from attitudes toward the minority group. In this paper we use a minority definition (in the context of examining respondents' attitudes towards minority groups) which is closest to the approach of Tajfel: „[minority is] a category of people... at the receiving end of certain attitudes and treatment from the »outside«” (Tajfel 1981).

Simpson and Yinger (1985) describe majority policies toward minorities as belonging to three main clusters: the acceptance or even support of multiculturalism, the attempt to eliminate the minority group and in between the two extremities is assimilation or – contrary to that – a parasitic exploitation of a subordinate group deliberately restrained to this position. Translated to the level of individual attitudes of the members of a majority group we might also find the corresponding three general attitudinal stances toward minority groups, namely tolerance, assimilationist, and discriminatory or exclusionist tendencies.

*Hypothesis 1.* Attitudes are expressions or manifestations of representations of complex interpersonal/intergroup relations, in the present case the relations between a dominant majority group and minorities. In a number of respects attitudes toward out-groups can reveal the preferred „strategy” toward these groups and therefore *can be arranged on a continuum ranging from tolerance through assimilationist tendencies to discrimination/exclusion.*

*Hypothesis 2.* Intergroup relations are determined by several factors – historical, societal, economic and psychological – and therefore attitudes toward specific groups in a society show great intergroup variation. However a *regular pattern determining the direction of the attitudes can be detected that reveals a generally preferred strategy toward minorities, a „meta-attitude”, that is not specific to the actual minority group in question but a general disposition characteristic of a person.*

Definitions of minorities inherently relate this concept to the concept of the nation the minority group belongs to, since the concept of the minority is meaningful only in relation to the latter. Based on theories of cognitive consistency (see e.g. Abelson et al. 1968) it is reasonable to assume that these concepts are similarly related in the attitude structure of the cognitive organisation. We proposed a model where the concepts of the minorities and the nation as well as the associated attitudes and emotions are inseparably interwoven in the representational structure of the mind.

*Hypothesis 3.* A regular relationship can be detected between attitudes toward one's nation and preferred strategies toward minorities – operationalised as the

relationship between the component attitudes of the hierarchical model of nationalism formulated by Dekker and Malova on one hand, and attitudes toward minorities organised on the tolerance-exclusion dimension on the other.

### *Method*

In order to test the above hypotheses we first use largely unanalysed data from two surveys conducted in 1994 and 1995 on the topic of ethnic attitudes. Both surveys used representative samples of the population. Based partly on the results of this first phase, we developed a questionnaire which targeted our hypotheses more precisely.

This questionnaire was employed in a non-representative, self-administered survey consisting of 405 secondary school students. The respondents were students of seven secondary schools in Budapest, 62 per cent in academic secondary schools (or „grammar schools”) and 38 per cent in vocational schools. The target age group was the 17–18 years old (grade 3 and 4); this age section made up 85 per cent of the sample, however, the total range of the age of the respondents varied between years of 16–21. The gender representation was not totally balanced – the sample consisted of 55 per cent females and 45 per cent males.

**The Questionnaire.** The questionnaire consisted of 5 sections and a total of 108 items. The sections were related to the following five topics. One section included 34 items related to attitudes toward the Roma population in Hungary, another section was similar but related to the Hungarian Jewry. These two sections were presented at the beginning of the questionnaire; in order to filter out the sequential effect we have varied the order of the two sections – half of the respondents received a version where the Jewish section was followed by the Roma one and the other half an inverse version. These two sections consisted of items assumed to be related to the three attitudinal stances of Hypothesis 1 – namely assimilation, discrimination and tolerance.

The third section was a revised version of the Nationalism questionnaire constructed by Dekker and Malova consisting of nineteen items related to various forms of national affiliations. That was followed by a nine-item section, included in order to investigate in more detail the concept of the nation held by the respondents, and finally seventeen items related to socio-economic variables.

### *Preparatory analysis*

The first phase of the research involved the secondary analysis of databases provided by two sociological surveys conducted in 1994 and 1995 on topics of ethnic attitudes.<sup>1</sup> The purpose of this phase was to carry out a preliminary test of

<sup>1</sup> The 1994 survey has been conducted by Ferenc Erős, Zsolt Enyedi, Zoltán Fleck and Zoltán Fábíán on attitudes toward the Roma, anti-Semitism, attitudes toward various outgroups and Authoritarianism; the 1995 survey has been conducted by András Kovács primarily on anti-Semitism but also involving a few attitude items related to the Roma.

Hypotheses 1 and 2 in order to gain some knowledge regarding the assumed attitude structure prior to the construction and fielding of our questionnaire.

The item analysis of the data offered by the 1995 anti-Semitism research revealed that attitudes towards Jews in Hungary with regards to strategies of cohabitation are indeed arranged into the three main hypothesised clusters. A similar analysis conducted on the data of the 1994 survey – containing items related to the Roma and the Jews as well – further validated this hypothesis. This survey contained enough items related to the Roma to give a preliminary picture of the three main clusters in both contexts. These results gave a firm base for Hypothesis 1 concerning the existence of the three main attitudinal stances – namely assimilation, discrimination and tolerance – for the consecutive phases of research.

A further analysis aimed to gain some insight into the place of the above described attitude clusters in different contexts, that is to test Hypothesis 2 concerning a general preferred strategy toward minorities. Although the two surveys serving as bases for the present investigation were constructed for hypotheses considerably different from ours and therefore contained only a fraction of the items that would have been necessary for a thorough testing, the results quite clearly disproved Hypothesis 2.

The 1995 anti-Semitism survey contained only three items related to the Roma, all three of highly discriminatory tone. The correlation of these three items with exclusionist attitude toward the Jews was significant but low (values in the range of .126 – .172,  $p < .001$ ). The 1995 survey allowed a comparison between the three attitude clusters toward the Roma and tolerant and exclusionist attitude toward Jews, revealing the following relationships.

**Table 1.**

	Roma Context	Assimilationist	Exclusionist	Tolerant
Jewish Context				
Exclusionist		.219**	.500** <sup>2</sup>	-.121*
Tolerant		.145*	.014	.163**

\* $p < .01$  \*\* $p < .001$

The above results point to the conclusion that attitudes toward Jews and the Roma are interrelated but not equivalent, therefore, the assumption concerning one „meta-attitude” independent of the actual target of the attitude is not justified.

As a conclusion we opted to include in the questionnaire attitude items about the Roma and the Jews separately but not including ones about minorities in general. The reason behind choosing these two groups to be investigated originated in the concept of the minority given by Tajfel at the beginning of this section. The Jews

<sup>2</sup> Since both surveys focused principally on hostile attitudes toward the investigated groups the exclusionist cluster was the most refined and that fact probably contributed to the relatively high correlation of these clusters.

and the Roma were the groups most often „at the receiving end of certain attitudes” and therefore examination of these attitudes is more than reasonable.

## Nation and nationalism


### *The Dekker–Malova Model of Nationalism*

The concept of nationalism used in the present paper had been developed by Dekker (1997) and his colleagues. They argued that in the field of nationalism research poorly defined conceptualisations are the largest obstacle for research and showed that the concept of nationalism is used in the literature to cover four main categories, often in a rather confusing way. Nationalism in some contexts means a political ideology or a political movement, for others it indicates the process of nation-building and finally in other contexts it stands for a particular political orientation of individuals.

Focusing on the fourth category – on individual political orientation – they pointed out that the concept of nationalism in this sense is frequently used as if it were identical to a number of different national orientations such as national consciousness or national feeling, national identity, loyalty to the nation, patriotism, and also as an „umbrella concept” intermingling separate dimensions such as belief in kinship or blood-tie, the desire for separation, the wish for pure or homogenous nations, ethnocentrism and so on.

In order to further clarify the concept of nationalism – as an attitude of certain individuals – Dekker and Malova introduced a complex structural model of national attitudes of which nationalism is one of the building blocks. They hypothesised – and empirically validated – six main attitudes related to the concept of one’s own country and people. The six attitudes differ in the kind of affect (positive, negative or neutral) and in the strength of the feeling. The most basic one – national feeling – is neutral and denotes the feeling of being part of the nation. The five others are assumed to be positive in the basic model although trajectories for negative attitudes are hypothesised as „escape routes” for subjects with a negative identification pattern. The five positive attitudes are national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority and nationalism.

The above mentioned attitudes are arranged into a cumulative hierarchy, that is, they indicate separate and hierarchically arranged stages of attitude development in the context of the nation. Each stage requires its fulfilment before the next can be developed that embeds all the lower levels.



The model had been empirically tested and verified on student samples in the Netherlands, in Slovakia and in the Basque Autonomous Community in Spain. The results confirm both the existence of the hypothesized six attitudes and their structural relationships.

The procedure had been repeated in our survey in order to test the validity of the model in Hungary on one hand and also to use it as a reference model in determining the relation of national orientations and attitudinal stances toward minorities.

The nationalism scale has been constructed by selecting and translating 19 relevant items from the 1995 Dutch survey and also from the questionnaire used in Slovakia in 1995/1996.

**Table 2. National attitudes in Hungary**

	Score	1	2	3	4	5
<b>National feeling</b>	$\alpha=.83$					
1. I feel I am Hungarian		1	3	12	20	64
2. I feel Hungary is my country		2	3	7	17	71
<b>National liking</b>	$\alpha=.776$					
3. I like the Hungarian language		1	2	4	19	74
4. I like Hungary		1	4	11	24	60
5. It is good to be a Hungarian		3	8	20	30	39
6. In general I like Hungarian people		0	3	22	37	38
<b>National pride</b>	$\alpha=.788$					
7. I am proud of Hungary		4	12	23	28	33
8. I am proud to be Hungarian		3	7	21	27	42
9. I am proud of what the Hungarian people achieved		4	7	27	27	35
<b>National preference</b>	$\alpha=.552$					
10. In general I prefer to have Hungarian people as my personal contacts than people from other countries		20	14	32	17	17
11. I prefer to live most of my life in Hungary than in any other country		11	15	31	17	26
<b>National superiority</b>	$\alpha=.65$					
12. In general I like Hungarian people more than people from other countries		18	18	31	20	13
13. In general Hungarian people are better than their nationalities		35	18	25	14	8
14. Hungary is the best country to live in		30	20	30	10	10
<b>Nationalism</b>	$\alpha=.759$					
15. I feel I share common roots, common origins with other Hungarians		15	18	25	20	22
16. I feel all Hungarians are members of a big family which I also belong to		19	24	26	17	14
17. I think all Hungarian people should live in Hungary		33	24	20	9	14
18. Hungarians should not mix with other nations		49	18	14	8	11
19. People of other than Hungarian nationality should leave the country		45	15	16	8	16

(percentage of respondents; score 1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree)

The survey confirmed that the scale was suitable for our sample as well – yielding similar results as the previous studies conducted in three other countries. The whole national attitude scale proved to be highly reliable (Cronbach  $\alpha = .856$  for all nineteen items) as well as most of the subscales, yielding Cronbach alphas ranging from .83 to .65 with the exception of the National Preference scale with a low alpha of .552.

These results – proving that the model works in several countries and languages regardless of the fact that various items have substantially different connotations in the different national contexts – further contribute to the strength of the validity of the model. The particular patterns of support the various items received in different countries are comparable but significant local variances do show up. For example, the item that received by far the highest support in Hungary – in contrast to all the surveys done in other countries – was item 3 (I like the Hungarian language) pointing to a special role language plays in the Hungarian national consciousness.

Investigating the other end of the distribution pattern we find statements with very low support, items that required a more or less objective comparison between Hungary or the Hungarians and other countries or nations – items 13 and 14 of the National Superiority subscale. While the respondents showed considerably stronger preference for Hungary or the Hungarian people where their emotional identification was concerned – see especially item 10 – they clearly do not think their country or their compatriots stand the test of international comparison.

Next we test the hypothesis that the structure of this attitude group is arranged into a cumulative hierarchy. To do this, we first measured the level of support for each attitude group represented by the six subscales by computing the average of the cumulative percentages of ratings 4 and 5 (agreement and strong agreement).

**Table 3. Support for the six attitudes**

Nationalism	28
National Superiority	25
National Preference	39
National Pride	64
National Liking	80
National Feeling	88

(percentage of respondents scoring 4-5 on the subscales)

The results show indeed a gradual decline of support for the attitudes positioned higher in the hierarchy except for the last two levels – National Superiority and Nationalism – where the distance is smaller. The fact that Nationalism scores somewhat higher than National Superiority – as opposed to the prediction of the model – probably arises from the above mentioned difference between emotional identification with certain concepts related to the nation and the evaluation of the same issues. While Hungarians strongly identify with their country as expressed by certain items of National Preference and Nationalism they do not think their country is the best or their compatriots are better than other nations – therefore their feeling of National Superiority is too weak to form the fifth stage of the Pyramid.

The next test to validate the hypothesis was to investigate the correlations between the subscales. The correlations were in the moderate range, varying from .35 to .72, none of them exceeding .80, which justified the separate but interrelated treatment of the subscales.

Assuming that the previously confirmed hierarchy is a cumulative one – that is each stage must be reached before the next can be developed – would ideally mean that differences between attitudes at the shortest distance are lower than those between attitudes at a larger distance in the hierarchy. Computing the dissimilarity of the attitudes represented by the subscales was very successful in proving the hypothesised structure of the hierarchy – the larger the assumed distance between the levels, the more dissimilar the attitudes are. These results appear in the dissimilarity matrix below as a pattern where figures become higher reading the matrix from top to bottom and from right to left.

**Table 4. Euclidean dissimilarity coefficient matrix of the national attitude subscales**

	1. National Feeling	2. National Liking	3. National Pride	4. National Preference	5. National Superiority
1. National Feeling					
2. National Liking	13.0				
3. National Pride	20.0	14.9			
4. National Preference	33.8	29.0	25.4		
5. National Superiority	41.4	36.6	30.8	18.8	
6. Nationalism	41.3	37.2	31.4	22.5	17.2

To sum up, we have successfully validated the Dekker–Malova model of Nationalism on a Hungarian sample. Despite the differences in the amount of support expressed in relation to some of the items of the scale in different countries the model in itself proved to be applicable in Hungary, exhibiting similar structural characteristics as those formulated in the original theory.

### *The concept of the nation*

One of the most important intercultural problems of the Central-Eastern European region is the disparity of national and ethnic boundaries, the often ambiguous relationship between ethnic/national affiliation and citizenship and the conflicts arising from these two aspects of national identification. One element of the above described phenomenon is the ambiguous perception of the concepts such as nation, state and nationality. In order to reveal in detail the attitude structure organised around the notion of the nation in the next phase of the research we investigated how the respondents perceive concepts such as nation, state and nationality. Empirical investigations have been conducted in that area since the early seventies in Hungary revealing an ambiguous and inconsistent comprehension of these notions. This ambiguity can be detected both in relation to the defining criteria of the nation as people – i.e. what criteria one has to meet in order to be considered Hungarian – and also in the definition of the nation in cultural versus political terms as captured by

the perception of the role of the minorities in relation to the nation, that is whether different ethnic groups in Hungary and Hungarian minorities outside the borders of the country are considered to be members of the Hungarian nation.

As regards to the cultural versus political concept of the nation a series of surveys starting from 1973 revealed the dominance of the political nation-concept in the seventies (for a summary see Lázár 1996). At the same time the studies conducted by Hunyadi and his colleagues (1974, 1975) investigated the defining criteria of the nation. Their analysis revealed two main types of definitions: one segment of the respondents considered „Hungarianness” as a natural or ascribed attribute, defined by birthplace or mother language, while others regarded it rather as something that can be achieved by learning or chosen by self-definition.

The past 25 years brought the gradual strengthening of a cultural-linguistic-ethnic concept beside the still existing political one, reflected in the increasing portion of the population considering Hungarians living in other countries belonging to the nation while ethnic-national groups living in Hungary are also still regarded as part of the Hungarian nation.

We have repeated the procedure in our survey with the same set of categories used in earlier studies to clarify the concept of the nation held by the respondents in our study.

**Table 5. The role of minorities in the definition of the nation**

Hungarians living in West-European countries	72
Hungarians living in neighbouring countries	82
Nationalities living in Hungary	47
Jews living in Hungary	68
Gypsies living in Hungary	46

(percentage of respondents indicating that he or she considers one or more groups out of the above five to be constituent of the nation)

Our results indicate the dominance of the ethnic-cultural concept of the nation among the respondents. Around three quarter of the respondents considered Hungarians living in other countries belonging to the Hungarian nation while less than half of them think the same way about national minorities and Gypsies living in Hungary. Altogether 25 per cent of the respondents considered only Hungarians living outside Hungary part of the nation but no members of other minorities – thus revealing a purely ethnic-cultural concept of the nation.

The results also show a relatively strong tendency to exclude Gypsies from being an integral part of the nation but not considerably more so than other ethnic groups. Although a .56 correlation between considering Gypsies or other national minorities as part of the nation indicates that there might be different acceptance patterns behind the similar numbers. Jews are somewhat in the middle, around two-thirds of the respondents considered them to be a part of the nation, a result that might imply the highly assimilated-integrated status of Jews and also the ambiguity of their perception as an ethnic group.

Parallel to the shift from a political to a cultural conceptualisation of the nation, in the past 30 years a similar transformation process went on concerning the key criterion for membership in a nation. According to the above cited investigations being Hungarian was mostly defined as some sort of attachment to the country in the early seventies while in the next twenty years more and more people considered linguistic-cultural attachment and self-definition also important elements. In our sample the results were the followings.

**Table 6. Defining criteria of being Hungarian**

Those born in Hungary	38
Hungarian citizens	39
Whose mother tongue is Hungarian	60
Who considers him/herself Hungarian	78

(percentage of respondents indicating that he/she considers one or more of these groups Hungarian)

These results are consistent with that of the previous section: the defining criteria for being Hungarian also reflect a cultural rather than a political conceptualisation of the nation, with an even stronger emphasis on self-definition. These results are in accordance with the outcome of an 1985 survey by Lázár and Dobossy revealing a rank order of importance of defining factors „indicating that the criteria of being considered Hungarian are arranged in the minds of people according to the degree of conscious choice, of the identification with being Hungarian versus the outcome of chance” (Lázár 1996: 57). Looking at the data in a more detailed analysis supports these results: according to 23 per cent of the sample self-definition in itself is an adequate criterion while another 16 per cent considered self-definition coupled with mother tongue to be a sufficient basis for accepting someone as Hungarian.

Investigating the interrelation of the two nation-concepts we found that those who only accept self-definition combined with language – strong cultural criteria – as the basis for belonging to the nation actually do have a cultural rather than a political concept of the nation, expressed in a lower-than-average acceptance of ethnic and national minorities and above-average recognition of Hungarians living outside the borders. On the other hand indicating all four items – self-definition, language, place of birth and citizenship – as defining criteria implies a tolerant rather than constraining attitude expressed by an above-average acceptance rate for all five minority categories.

Having the two nation-concepts defined on the sample as a whole we tested the assumption that respondents of different levels of national identification might hold different concepts about the nation. In other words, we investigated whether different scores achieved on the nationalism scale correspond to differences in the views concerning the defining criteria and conceptualization of the nation.

**Table 7. The changing concept of the nation by degree of nationalism**

	Sample average	Scores on the Nationalism scale				
		1	2	3	4	5
Hungarians living in West-European countries	72	63	77	68	71	76
Hungarians living in neighbouring countries	82	74	83	82	84	86
Nationalities living in Hungary	47	72	54	44	22	9
Jews living in Hungary	68	96	79	60	40	9
Gypsies living in Hungary	46	75	59	40	14	0

(percentage of respondents; score 1=refusal of all nationalistic items, 5=acceptance of nationalistic items)

The results show that respondents who completely refuse nationalistic views have a relatively strong political concept of the nation as compared to the sample average. This is indicated in a relatively lower acceptance rate for Hungarian minorities living outside the borders of Hungary as part of the nation but a very high acceptance level – 72–96 per cent – for ethnic and national minorities within the country. As identification with nationalistic attitudes increases we see an abrupt decrease of acceptance concerning minorities in Hungary – resulting in less than 10 percent for Jews and national minorities and zero (!) for Gypsies – indicating an almost total rejection of a political definition of the nation but largely accepting it in ethnic terms as a correlate of strong nationalistic attitudes. Overall the transformation of the nation-concepts parallel to the strengthening of nationalistic attitudes is very clear in the case of the vanishing political concept of the nation but less so in the case of the increasing ethnic-cultural concept.

In terms of the defining criteria of who is considered Hungarian, the picture is less clear. The first variable – being born in Hungary – is basically accepted by roughly a third of the respondents in all subgroups and in the whole sample as well. Citizenship is given a decreasing emphasise with growing nationalism, a process which is consistent with the simultaneous decline of the political nation-concept. Self-definition gets clearly limited as national affiliation increases and is most probably going also through a transformation of connotations. While people with non-nationalistic attitudes consider self-definition as an option to be chosen or not by minorities, nationalists expect certain groups, namely Hungarians living outside Hungary, to define themselves as Hungarians.

**Table 8. Acceptance of the various defining criteria of being Hungarian by degree of nationalism**

	Sample average	Scores on the Nationalism scale				
		1	2	3	4	5
Those born in Hungary	38	35	37	43	38	38
Hungarian citizens	39	44	48	31	25	29
Whose mother tongue is Hungarian	60	51	68	56	53	67
Who considers him/herself Hungarian	78	84	86	72	67	67

(percentage of respondents; score 1=refusal of all nationalistic items, 5=acceptance of all nationalistic items)

The Dekker–Malova model of Nationalism focused on the process of developing and strengthening national attitudes culminating at the level of Nationalism. The above described investigation gave us some insight into the parallel processes as well: the changes in the meaning of some of the concepts and in the association of these views and the attitudes under study.

The above results further establish the hypothesis which posits systematic relationships between various national orientations and attitudes toward cohabitant minority groups. We have seen that strong identification with nationalistic attitudes correlates with an ethnic rather than political conceptualisation of the nation. That in itself indicates a strong obstacle to attempts for assimilation on the part of minority group members since such view emphasises the ascribed nature of the nation and does not leave much space for self-categorisation. Therefore, part of the original hypothesis can be refined: we can assume that assimilationist views of the majority group are decreasing as national affiliations gather strength. On the other hand, we still do not know what stage one has to achieve with respect to national affiliations to support discrimination toward these non-assimilated groups rather than to tolerate their being an ethnically-culturally different fraction of the society.

## **Attitudes toward minorities**

### *Attitudes toward the Roma*

The survey questionnaire contained 34 items related to majority attitudes toward the Roma population in Hungary. A factor analysis conducted on these items revealed four main clusters of attitudes: beside the originally hypothesised assimilationist, tolerant and discriminationist dispositions there was a fourth one expressing antiracist, positive discriminatory opinions.

**Table 9. Assimilationist attitudes toward the Roma**

Assimilationist scale (Cronbach $\alpha$ =.698)	1	2	3	4	5	Mean score	
1. Gypsies should be forced to live like others	15	16	22	18	29	3.3	} FACTOR I.
2. Gypsies should be totally Magyarised	43	27	19	7	4	2.02	
3. Inter-marriages between Gypsies and a non-Gypsies can only be lasting if the Gypsy partner completely conforms to the other	38	15	27	9	11	2.39	
4. There are decent Gypsies but the majority of them are not so	6	11	17	22	44	3.87	
5. Although there are many poor people among Gypsies and non-Gypsies as well, but Gypsies do much less to help their situation	7	8	15	26	44	3.92	
6. Gypsies should be primarily blamed for the aversions toward them	3	10	21	25	41	3.92	
7. The problems of the Gypsies would be solved if they finally started to work	7	14	23	27	29	3.57	} FACTOR II.
8. Rich Gypsies should support the poor ones	8	4	22	21	45	3.93	
9. The main obstacle in the way of the Roma integration is their low level of education, the lack of professional training	8	9	16	26	41	3.83	
10. Gypsies can best integrate into the society if they live dispersed and not in closed communities	10	10	30	27	23	3.41	
11. The basic problem of the Gypsies arises from their lack of a home country	24	12	19	20	25	3.07	} FACTOR III.
<b>Total<sup>3</sup></b>	<b>0</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3.37</b>	

Assimilationist attitudes toward the Roma can be grouped into three further subcategories according to a supplementary factor analysis performed on the eleven items of the scale. The largest factor consists of items – the first six in the above table – expressing very strong, even aggressive assimilationist claims coupled with the view that blames exclusively the Roma for their disadvantageous situation. The distribution of the answers shows that the latter element – the „blame” – received high agreement, while forced assimilation is supported only concerning life-style differences and the respondents would not accept total assimilation.

The second group of attitudes – numbered seven to ten in the above table – consists of opinions related to more or less objective factors influencing the life of the Roma, such as lack of education, segregation and economical factors that hinder integration. Generally these statements received strong agreement. The one which received the least support was related to the question of segregation, an issue that

<sup>3</sup> Total score has been calculated by the following procedure. First the scores given for the individual items had been summed, then ranges of these numbers recoded, whereby score of 1 to 1.5 were recoded into score 1, scores between 1.6–2.5 were recoded into score 2 and so on to produce a 5 point scale again for comparison.

roused heated debates in several towns and villages in Hungary in the past few years.

Finally, a third factor emerged consisting of the single item related to the lack of a home country for the Roma, an item that had the lowest factor score on the assimilationist factor in the first analysis and one that could not elicit a marked rating pattern.

Distribution of the total scores shows that assimilationist attitudes were largely accepted, nonetheless, only a very small fraction of the sample supported them wholeheartedly. The mean score of the scale for the whole sample is 3.37, the highest result among the four scales<sup>4</sup>.

**Table 10. Tolerant attitudes toward the Roma**

Tolerance scale (Cronbach $\alpha=.854$ )	1	2	3	4	5	Mean score
1. Gypsies should be allowed to live their life according to their own customs and culture until it does not disturb others	2	3	11	21	63	4.37
2. The art of the Gypsies enriches Hungarian culture	19	16	22	21	22	3.11
3. Gypsies must not abandon their traditions	10	12	24	25	29	3.51
4. Gypsies should be supported in their efforts to maintain their traditions, language and culture	17	15	28	20	20	3.14
5. There should be a choice of schools for Gypsies to send their children to, teaching in Roma language or in Hungarian	21	11	24	21	23	3.13
6. Gypsy children should be able to learn also in their mother-tongue in the school	19	16	28	19	18	3.02
7. Gypsies should be enabled to manage their affairs by themselves	15	15	29	24	17	3.11
8. Gypsies are prepared in every way to pass decisions concerning their own affairs	18	21	22	22	17	2.98
9. There is nothing wrong with teenage childbirth for example if this is all right according to their customs	41	16	17	12	14	2.42
<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3.14</b>

Results related to the first item of the tolerance scale might suggest that our respondents would demonstrate a very high level of tolerance, at least in principle, were the differences between the way of life of the Roma and the others not so disturbing. However, the sudden drop of support shown for items related to any specific differences indicates that the reality is somewhat different.

Cultural differences are largely tolerated while autonomy is questioned and the different lifestyle is clearly refused. Respondents supported the maintenance of Roma culture and traditions but did not really consider it part of the colourful cultural life of the country and were even less willing to support it.

As regards to statements concerning the education of Roma children in their mother tongue, these are neither really supported nor rejected and both are significantly and negatively correlated with the highly supported statement about segregated schools (see item 6 of the Discrimination scale,  $r=-.319$  and  $r=-.226$  with item 5 and item 6 of the Tolerance scale,  $p<.001$ ). This result implies that according

<sup>4</sup> All means differ significantly ( $p<.01$ ) except in the case of tolerance and discrimination.

to the view of a large proportion of our respondents Roma children should go to separate schools but what and how they learn there bears not much importance.

The strong refusal of teenage childbirth among the Roma clearly expresses an intolerance toward a markedly different life style but significant negative correlation with item 8 of the Discrimination scale ( $r=-.282$ ,  $p<.001$ ) implies that it is a not so subtle expression of fear of the increasing proportion of Roma in the population of the country.

The general attitude the results of the above two scales reveals can be described as a strong inclination on the part of members of the majority society to push the Roma in the direction of losing their distinct attributes – primarily those that are in contrast with the way non-Roma people conduct their lives. The emphasis is not on cultural assimilation as regards to language usage or cultural traditions but on removing factors that hinder their absorption into mainstream society. The realisation of the assimilation process is largely seen as being the task of the Roma community coupled with the view that unsuccessful assimilation originates there too.

**Table 11. Discriminationist attitudes toward the Roma**

<b>Discrimination scale</b> (Cronbach $\alpha=.923$ )	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Mean score</b>
1. The customs of the Gypsies and the non-Gypsies differ so much that intermarriages cannot be lasting	32	23	22	12	11	2.48
2. Gypsies will never integrate into Hungarian society	9	13	24	23	31	3.57
3. Gypsies do not deserve support	31	20	22	9	18	2.66
4. Gypsies should be totally separated from the rest of society as they are incapable of coexistence	40	17	14	10	19	2.52
5. It is laudable that there are still public places where Gypsies are not welcome	24	16	16	13	31	3.16
6. Everyone has the right to send their children to schools where there are no Gypsy children	13	12	17	11	47	3.67
7. Residents of villages and towns in Hungary should have the option to chose whether to let Gypsies to settle there	23	18	16	16	27	3.1
8. The increase in the number of Gypsy population threatens the security of the society	7	14	22	21	36	3.69
9. Criminal inclination is in the blood of the Gypsies	23	19	16	18	24	3.03
10. Policemen should have greater freedom of action against Gypsy than non-Gypsy criminals	51	13	13	8	15	2.26
<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>2.97</b>

The peaceful coexistence of Roma and non-Roma individuals in the private sphere seems possible in the views of the respondents as expressed in the strong rejection of the first item as opposed to their opinion about social integration – see item 2 – which is rather pessimistic. While the two items are closely related ( $r=.447$ ,  $p<.001$ ), the rating patterns elicited by the two are mirror images.

The majority of the respondents accept the need for social support for the Roma but very strongly refuse positive discrimination, as shown in the case of item 2 of the anti-racist scale.

Segregation in various contexts receives different amounts of support. Segregation in schools is highly advocated, a result that is more weighty given that these ratings are given by secondary school students. This result differs from those

produced by adult samples where items measuring inclination for social distancing also often include a statement about the mixed education of Roma and non-Roma children but there it is usually rather easily accepted (see e.g. Tomka 1979). Tomka (1991) summarizing the results of surveys conducted between 1978 and 1989 in this topic concludes that support for segregation in different contexts largely depends on the extent to which the issue in question concerns the respondents personally. Therefore, adults see Gypsies moving into their neighborhood as much less acceptable than integrated schooling or mixed marriage – the latter is highly unlikely to occur, therefore not threatening – while in our sample of students the question of segregated schooling was of high personal involvement and received one of the highest agreement rates<sup>5</sup>.

Total social segregation is rather strongly rejected but at the same time acceptance of Gypsy inhabitants in neighborhoods is seen as a matter of decision to be made by the residents – that is implicitly a vote for settlement segregation. Issues concerning separation in public places are evaluated ambiguously yielding rather high frequencies of total rejection and total agreement as well.

Statements implying racial discrimination receive different degrees of support. One of the items receiving the highest agreement (mean=3.66) is the one related to the threat posed by the growing number of the Roma population – an opinion that inherently connects the Roma with criminality. On the other hand the statement about Gypsy criminality being „genetic” – the most racist item – yields a „U” shape rating profile and a mean of 3.00. Finally negative discrimination concerning police conduct is very strongly rejected. However, a discriminant analysis of the interrelations of these three items reveals that a racist disposition does influence views on Roma criminality. Investigating the answer patterns of respondents giving a score of five on item 9 – strong racist disposition – yields the following results: each such respondent (100 per cent) gave a score of four or five on item 8 – related to the threat to security of society – and 62 percent rated item 10 – different behaviour by the police – with a score of 4 or 5.

**Table 12. Anti-racist attitudes toward the Roma**

<b>Anti-racist, positive discriminatory scale</b> (Cronbach $\alpha$ =.923)	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Mean score</b>
1. The Hungarian government should do more in favour of the Roma	31	18	30	11	10	2.51
2. Gypsies should receive more help than non-Gypsies	64	17	12	5	2	1.65
3. The greatest obstacle for Gypsies in their integration efforts into Hungarian society is people's aversion to Gypsies	20	19	20	20	21	3.03
4. The Gypsy question is the result of racism	25	16	25	17	17	2.84
<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2.38</b>

<sup>5</sup> These results seriously question the overall applicability of the Bogardus scale but support the view that the items of the scale might have different connotations relative to the context.

The last factor of the Roma-related attitudes is the collection of explicitly anti-racist and positive discriminatory statements that received the lowest level of agreement among the four factors. Positive discriminatory actions are clearly rejected, the more explicitly they involve financial action, the more so. Although the negative role of anti-Gypsy attitudes in the integration process of the Roma are acknowledged by a considerable fraction of the respondents, the roots of the Roma problems seem to be found elsewhere.

### *Attitudes toward the Jews*

The questionnaire involved 28 items related to attitudes toward Jews in Hungary. Factor analysis revealed that twenty-one of these belong to the three hypothesised attitudinal stances, namely assimilationist, tolerant and discriminationist directions while the remaining seven items either did not appear on these three factors with interpretable factor scores or belonged to two very small, further factors. The three scales presented below are products of the factor analysis; a consecutive item analysis had been conducted in addition on the items of the tolerance scale in order to create a scale with acceptable reliability measures.

**Table 13. Discriminationist attitudes toward the Jews**

<b>Discrimination scale</b> (Cronbach $\alpha$ =.856)	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Mean Score</b>
1. Jewish emigration from Hungary should be encouraged	61	13	11	4	11	1.92
2. Jews should better live in their own state, in Israel	32	22	19	10	17	2.56
3. Jews disintegrate and weaken nations that assimilate them	46	21	14	8	11	2.15
4. The number of Jews should be limited in certain professions	56	10	12	8	14	2.15
5. The interest of Jews in Hungary often differ from that of non-Jews	16	17	30	17	20	3.09
6. Jews still have to change considerably for their differences to disappear	30	19	24	11	16	2.62
7. Jews are not really willing to integrate into the Hungarian society	29	22	28	14	7	2.5
8. Jews are primarily to be blamed for the aversion toward them	42	21	18	5	14	2.28
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2.34</b>

Statements on the discrimination scale which questioned the relationship between the Hungarian Jewry and the nation generally received strong disapproval but we found some variation among the three items (see items 1-3 in the above table). While the majority of the respondents did not identify with ideas that deeply questioned the place of Jews among the population of the country, only over half of them rejected (gave a score of 1 or 2) the statement that said that Jews should live in Israel. Since this latter item correlates very strongly with the items supporting emigration ( $r=.69$  with item 1.,  $p<.001$ ) and regarding Jews as a threat to the nation ( $r=.66$  with item 3.,  $p<.001$ ), we can conclude that it is not an expression of support for Jewish nationalism but it belongs to the attitude group expressing exclusionist opinions, although in a subtler form.

Restrictions concerning the number of Jews in certain fields of professions would be acceptable for a quarter of the respondents while it is refused by two third of them.

As regard to differences or distance perceived between Jews and others, half of the respondents do not see Jews considerably different from the rest of society and see no problem with their integration efforts. Respondents' views regarding the issue of potential interest conflict is rather neutral.

Finally almost three-quarters of the respondents would not blame the Jews for the negative attitudes directed against them.

**Table 14. Assimilationist attitudes toward the Jews**

<b>Assimilationist scale</b> Cronbach $\alpha=.832$ )	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Mean score</b>
1. Intermarriage between a Jew and a non-Jew is only acceptable if the Jewish partner converts to Christianity	59	16	10	6	9	1.89
2. Intermarriages between Jews and non-Jews are not good for any of the partners	62	13	14	5	6	1.79
3. The customs of Jews and non-Jews differ so much that intermarriages cannot be lasting	48	23	18	5	6	2.0
4. Children of intermarriages should not be told that one of their parents is Jewish	73	8	7	3	9	1.68
5. Mixed marriages can only be lasting if the Jewish partner completely conforms to the other	46	21	19	6	8	2.07
<b>Total</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1.88</b>

Items that fall into the factor of assimilation seem to center around the issue of mixed marriages and concern various aspects of intermarriage that are relevant in the context of assimilation. Generally speaking all these items were strongly rejected, assuming that potentially perceived differences between Jews and others are not identified as obstacles in this respect and also expressing the view that intermarriages are not seen as tools for assimilation. This latter view is further reinforced by the fact that an item supporting more mixed marriages (see item 2 of the next table) received strong negative factor score on the assimilation factor but clearly belonged to the tolerance scale.

Altogether the mean total score of the assimilation scale is by far the lowest not only in the Jewish context but among all the six scales including the Roma context as well. That fact most probably resulted from the highly assimilated status of Hungarian Jewry.

**Table 15. Tolerant attitudes toward the Jews**

Tolerance scale (Cronbach $\alpha=.739$ )	1	2	3	4	5	Mean score	
1. It is not interesting any more whether someone is Jewish or not nowadays in Hungary	19	18	19	22	22	3.10	Factor I.
2. More intermarriages between Jews and non-Jews would be preferable	24	16	46	9	5	2.56	
3. There is nothing wrong with the fact that someone feels and declares him/herself Jewish in one situation and Hungarian in others	26	10	20	17	27	3.09	
4. Jews belong to the Hungarian nation	13	11	16	20	40	3.58	
5. Being Jewish or not has no significance concerning marriage	14	9	14	16	47	3.73	
6. Jewish integration into Hungarian society is primarily hindered by anti-Semitism	14	15	25	25	21	3.22	Factor II.
7. It is inconceivable why Jews are hated	14	10	19	18	39	3.22	
8. The Jewish question was invented by the anti-Semites	20	11	29	17	23	3.24	
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3.18</b>	

According to a further factor analysis conducted on the items of the tolerance scale attitudes expressing a tolerant disposition toward Jews can be grouped into two further subcategories. The first five statements in the above table express the view that differentiation between Jews and others is not relevant or interesting while the last three items are related to negative attitudes toward Jews which still create differences and hinder integration.

Altogether we can conclude that attitudes expressing tolerance toward Jews in Hungary received the highest rate of agreement, discriminationist views meet some disapproval, while assimilationist dispositions are the least supported by our respondents.

In this section we have examined the main clusters of attitudes articulated toward the Jews and the Roma in Hungary. The results further disproved our initial hypothesis related to the existence of a generally preferred attitudinal strategy toward all minorities – irrespective of the actual nature of the group in question. We could see that support for the three main strategies – assimilation, discrimination and tolerance – differ considerably regarding the two minority groups we investigated. These results are in accordance with other comparative studies concerning national and ethnic minorities in Hungary, which were summarised by Lázár as follows: "[A]cceptance of minorities depends less on the cultural level... of the recipient but more on the cultural distance of the recipients and the accepted, that is the cultural... level of the accepted" (Lázár 1996: 54). Our findings of considerably different dispositions toward the two groups elicited from a sample which was relatively homogenous in terms of cultural level thus underline Lázár's argument that the determining factor in this context is the perceived distance of the minority group from mainstream society.

Comparing the relative support for the three main strategies in relation to the two groups we studied we see an inverse pattern. Regarding the Jews tolerant attitudes proved to be the strongest, a result which can be attributed to the high cultural level

of this group that makes acceptance relatively easy. Discriminationist attitudes were located in the middle while assimilationist strategies received very low support – probably due to the highly assimilated status of the Hungarian Jewry.

The same analysis revealed the opposite distribution of agreement concerning the Roma. In their case assimilation received significantly higher support than tolerance and discrimination, the two latter clusters yielding similar acceptance levels. These results can be accounted for, on one hand, by the fact that the content of negative prejudices concerning the Roma expresses mostly conflicts arising from the differences in the way of life of the Roma and the non-Roma. Respondents seem to think that to solve the problem, the differences between the Roma and non-Roma must be eradicated mostly through the Roma adapting a non-Roma life-style, a process many believe can be accelerated by forced assimilation. On the other hand, the Roma are often accepted as an ethnic group with distinct cultural traditions, the maintenance of which is supported and cultural assimilation to this extent is perceived as unnecessary, which is a factor which increases tolerance.

### **Investigation of Hypothesis 3 – the structural relation of national orientations and attitudes toward the minorities**

Lázár (1996) investigated various factors behind the different attitudes in relation to the problems of the Roma and found that the concept of the nation held by the respondent was the main determinant beside socio-economic variables.

Assuming that the relationship we found between the understanding of the notion of the nation and attitudes toward a minority group is of high significance that can be further refined we investigated the relation of national affiliation with attitudinal stances toward the Roma and the Jews. We have examined how the position achieved on the six levels of national affiliation and the strength of support displayed on the three main attitude scales are related. The table below shows the correlations between the six Nationalism subscales and the three minority attitude scales – separately for the Jewish and the Roma context.

**Table 16. Correlation of national orientations and attitudinal stances toward the Roma**

	Discrimination	Assimilation	Tolerance
National Feeling	.2079**	.2463**	-.1009
National Liking	.0989	.2103**	-.0089
National Pride	.1673*	.2403**	-.0583
National Preference	.3098**	.2973**	-.2236**
National Superiority	.4298**	.3360**	-.2898**
Nationalism	.5434**	.4112**	-.4490**

\*p<.01 \*\*p<.001

**Table 17. Correlation of national orientations and attitudinal stances toward the Jews**

	Discrimination	Assimilation	Tolerance
National Feeling	.197**	.161*	-.152*
National Liking	.148	.145*	-.130
National Pride	.199**	.174*	-.169*
National Preference	.270**	.280**	-.154*
National Superiority	.373**	.374**	-.247**
Nationalism	.529**	.546**	-.385**

\* p<.01 \*\* p<.001

At the first glance we see marked general directions in the interdependence of the examined variables in the tables above: Except for some fluctuation at the first three stages<sup>6</sup>, we found a close-to-linear increase in discriminationist and assimilationist attitudes as national affiliations became more pronounced and as tolerance decreased. The fact that there is a vast gap between the level of National Pride and Preference in almost all the six cases might imply that attitudes making up the levels of the Nationalism Pyramid not only increase in strength from the bottom of the pyramid to the top but there might be a qualitative change between the level of National Pride and Preference. It is from the level of National Preference and onward where attachment to the nation involves some sort of comparison between one's own nation and others, an association that might strongly interfere with attitudes toward groups not unambiguously constituting the core of the nation.

The first pattern of relations obvious from both tables is that none of the nationalism subscales have a positive relationship with tolerance. In the case of the Roma the first three stages – from national feeling to national pride – have no significant relation with tolerance while the top three levels – from national preference to nationalism – show highly significant, strong negative correlations. The same connections are even more marked in the case of Jews where all levels of national affiliations but national liking are significantly and negatively correlated with tolerance. These results imply that tolerance toward the Jews – the most supported strategy in the sample in general – declines as soon as one enters the Pyramid of Nationalism with the exception of the stage of National Liking, while in the case of the Roma tolerance starts to decrease with the appearance of National

<sup>6</sup> Factor analysis conducted on the items of the Nationalism scale did not separate the items of National Feeling and National Liking. Therefore we attempted to solve the irregularity experienced at the first three levels by combining the six items of National Feeling and Liking. Correlations of this combined subscale with the attitudes toward the minorities fit into the structure of the assumed pyramid much better than the original two separate subscales.

	Assimilationist	Discriminationist	Tolerant	Assimilationist	Discriminationist	Tolerant
	attitude toward the Roma			attitude toward the Jews		
National Feeling +Liking combined	.243**	.148*	-.049	.164*	.177**	-.148*

\* p<.01, \*\*p<.001

Preference. The difference between the attitudes toward the two minorities in this case might be attributed to the difference between the symbolic functions of anti-Semitism closely associated with national sentiments and the rather ethnocentric attitudes toward the Roma.

The negative correlation between National Feeling and Tolerance challenges the assumption of the neutrality of the attitude of National Feeling hypothesized by Dekker and Malova. In a wider context it also raises the question – far beyond the scope of the present work – whether we can postulate national affiliation or national identity which is neutral in affect, thus is unrelated to prejudices toward minorities.

As regards to assimilation and discrimination related to the Jews, we find a similar and very strong increase in both cases with the ascending in the hierarchy of national attitudes. However, in the case of the Roma we can observe an interesting pattern of correlations: both assimilation and discrimination increase as national affiliations strengthen but while assimilation gains more strength in the first three levels, discrimination wins from the level of National Preference and onward. This result combined with the finding that negative correlation between national affiliations and tolerance turns significant from the level of National Preference further supports the assumption that the gap between National Pride and Preference is of greater significance than other steps in the Pyramid.

The second major step in the development of the attitude pyramid is the last one from the level of National Superiority to the level of Nationalism where again all the above described tendencies gain significant strength.

Summing up the above results, we found ample support for the systematic interrelatedness of the attitudes assumed in *Hypotheses 3*. On the other hand an interesting contradiction also appeared. Toward the end of the second section we pointed out the connection between identification with nationalism and the dominance of an ethnic conceptualization of the nation, a category where national affiliation is seen to be a matter of ascription rather than achievement. We refined *Hypothesis 3* in the light of these results since this approach to the concept of the nation does not leave much space for the assimilationist attempts of the minorities. Now we can see that the cognitive structuring of this collection of attitudes does not follow such a strict logic, since the assimilationist expectation gains strength – almost parallel to the discriminationist strategy – with the development of stronger national affiliations.

## **Conclusion**

The study presented above investigated attitudes organised around the notion of the nation, attitudes toward the Roma and the Jewish minority in Hungary and explored the structural relationship between the two clusters of dispositions.

The investigation tested three hypotheses about these relationship through the use of a questionnaire given to a non-representative sample of secondary school students in Budapest. The data yielded by our survey provided a firm base for two of the hypotheses while a third one was rejected. We could prove that the representational

structure of attitudes toward minorities is indeed organised into three main clusters or strategies: assimilation, discrimination and tolerance. We tested the validity of the Dekker–Malova Nationalism Model in Hungary and found support for a systematic relationship between the stages of national orientation and attitudinal strategies toward minorities. However we had to reject the hypotheses regarding the existence of one dominant strategy toward minorities in general, regardless of the actual group in question.

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