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ISTVÁN BIBÓ AND MAX WEBER¹

In an interview given to Tibor Huszár in 1976, István Bibó² made the following somewhat unexpected statement: "Max Weber has had and still has an enormous influence over me" (Litván-S. Varga 1995: 216). This assertion may call our attention to a yet unrevealed potential source of inspiration for Bibó. This paper attempts to answer the following question: can we take Bibó's declaration seriously or not? The answer can corroborate or falsify a longstanding opinion of Bibó's admirers and also his opponents that he was primarily a politician and publicist rather than a social scientist. On the one hand, our task is made the more difficult by the fact that Bibó's writings contain just a handful of direct quotations from Weber, crucial though they might be. On the other hand, there is a relative abundance of illuminating argumentations reflecting, sometimes polemically or through the medium of other authors, the indirect influence of the great German sociologist and also concerning the key issues in Bibó's life-work. As we shall see, Bibó had a high opinion of Weber not least because he held Barna Horváth and István Hajnal in great esteem, too. For my present purposes I shall deal with Weber only inasmuch as it helps to reach a better understanding of Bibó.

Lacking sufficient evidence on Bibó's sources, my method of investigation will primarily be comparison. In the following passages I shall discuss three main areas of intellectual sympathy for Weber: the Protestant ethic, legitimacy and rationality.

I.

Max Weber's Protestant Ethic (1930) played an important role in Bibó's career in two ways. First, it inspired his debut publication (1928). Second, it was the source of the young Bibó's principal ideas in his writings on cultural crisis in modernity.

In the aforementioned interview the author recalls the introductory publication as follows: "...As a youngster in eighth grade, I had to deliver a speech in commemoration of the Reformation and I held this speech on the basis of Max Weber's essay that my father gave me. This was my first encounter with Max Weber..." (Litván-S. Varga 1995: 216). It is worth taking a closer look at the 17-year-old grammar school student's speech because in several aspects it already anticipates the older Bibó.

Bibó suggests that the greatest and most revolutionary thoughts of Reformation are "a return to the basics of the Holy Writs; the rejection of clinging to unalterable dogmas in favour of a free quest of truth; the evaluation of estates and masses replaced by the evaluation of the individual; a rejection of ceremonial formalities promoting salvation in favour of the search for divine grace; contemplative religiosity replaced by active faith" (1928: 2). Relief from magic is a recurrent motive in the article: "As Luther searched for the Christian truth solely in the Holy Scripture, so did they search for the natural sciences in nature itself and likewise for philosophy in the human mind itself..." (1928: 2). It is noteworthy that the principle "things

should be explained by their own causes" (1986c: 123) dominates Bibó's thinking throughout his career, in particular his theory on the nature of political hysterias (1986a: 373-380).

The following argumentation taken from the same speech is also of decisive importance in the author's oeuvre, primarily in his essay on the Jewish question, in the paragraph concerning dehumanised relations: "Reformation also renewed the evaluation of man. Mediaeval man was collective. As far as both religion and society are concerned, it was not his individuality but the estate he belonged to that played a key role. His value was determined by his being a churchman or a layman, a knight or a burgher, a seigneur or a vassal" (1928: 2).

The deepest impression that the Protestant Ethic made on Bibó was due to the idea of calling; although this is not yet evident in his 1928 speech, it comes to the fore only later. Earlier Bibó had appreciated Reformation as a current qualified to respond the challenges of the 20th century but 15 years later he already realized that it was in fact instrumental in bringing about the crisis of values. In his essay entitled "Money" he points out that while in modern times Mediaeval elites were dismissed, they were not replaced by competent new elites:

"...The clerical estate ceased to be the only intellectual leader of people who began to lose faith in the inherited privileges of the kingdom and the nobility... For a while, in some parts of the European civilisation, the Mediaeval social value system based on faith and inheritance was successfully replaced by the values of capitalist bourgeoisie who also attempted to solve the problem of the distribution of money. This solution stemmed from the originally simple and deeply religious value system of urban burghers and, as Max Weber pointed out, it was from Protestantism that it borrowed its special moral character that participated in the ethical foundation of capitalism.

According to the bourgeois value system, wealth is the reward of labour and, on the grounds of the New Testament parable on talents, it is the owner's duty to manage the property entrusted to him. In other words, capital, as the accumulation of talents, came to be ethically evaluated, and the most conspicuous phenomenon of money economy, i.e. interest, which was incompatible with the moral value system of the Middle Ages, was looked upon as the fruit and reward of the faithful and industrious steward...The whole bourgeois value system, however, was only instructive for the petty bourgeois and middle class lifestyle and only in a lucky socio-economic situation in which the excessive affluence of society did not result in antagonistic conflicts because everyone willing to work, even the poorest, had the chance to accumulate capital. Later, however, a contradiction developed between the excessive wealth of capitalists and the poverty of the masses and in this situation wealth no more improved but impaired its moral balance. To reestablish this balance capitalism ought to have produced a group of people who, in possession of significant financial opportunities, conformed to a similar value system and regulated lifestyle that characterised the feudal landlords. However, that would have taken a longer time than was available and the simple moral categories of the bourgeoisie were not adequate for such a purpose either. That is why the value-destroying impact of the one-dimensionality of money was so unscrupulously effective in connection with capitalist big wealth" (1986a: 215-216).

This part in the text is important because it illustrates Bibó's theoretical grounds as an anti-capitalist and a philosopher of crisis which in turn also dominate his review on Karl Mannheim's book, *Diagnosis of Our Time*. In his criticism, opposing Mannheim's interpretation of Weber, Bibó points out that the replacement of *Gesinnungsethik* dominant in liberal capitalism by *Verantwortungsethik*, that is, "awareness is not primarily required by the

development of mass society but by crisis that accompanies it. It was, however, not caused but aggravated by the development of mass society because it emerged in an era when social evaluation began to face a crisis..." (1986a: 269). In 1971 Bibó still clings to this line of argument which is Weberian in its origin but runs in a different direction in *The Meaning of European Social Development* (1986c: 65-66), although some accents are modified. After the turning-point of World War II and having read the main work of his master, Guglielmo Ferrero (1942), he, as a "criseologist" began to underline the *political* character of the crisis and, from an anthropological point of view, started to attribute it to fear.

II.

It is quite clear that the outlook of Bibó's view on legitimacy owes a lot to Ferrero. It has, however, due to the influence of Barna Horváth³, some Weberian traits as well. Nevertheless, the relationship is not obvious: Weber's theory of legitimacy did not influence Bibó directly. In Bibó's opinion, legitimacy is synoptical and it is Barna Horváth who has the copyright of the synoptical method, which is built on semi-Weberian bases, his is what we'll discuss first.

The young István Bibó, a member of the so-called Szeged school of Hungarian legal philosophy and Barna Horváth's disciple, was an adherent of the synoptical method, although his understanding of synopsis is slightly different (Bibó 1986a: 5-149; 1937: 623-638). What is the relationship of the Master, Barna Horváth to Weber's sociology? In one of his principal works he mentions Weberianism as the most congenial with the synoptical method: "Experts will not fail to notice the similarity between the synoptical method and idealtypical construction. Namely, the essence of both lies in that the function of the *Is* aiming at the *Ought* is likely to become fixed in the sense that the result of the *Ought* becomes causally adequate. However, this likelihood has to be tested in every historical moment because the existential effect may become norm-adequate as well" (Horváth 1934: 96).

There is a deeper homology between Horváth and Weber that in part affects Bibó as well and is also a basic idea of synopsis: the consequent avoidance of wishful thinking, i.e. the identification of facts with norms (Weber 1949; Horváth 1939). This is a main perspective in Bibó's oeuvre although he is less sensitive to the feeling and to the theoretical insight suggesting that *Sein* and *Sollen* are separated from each other. Consequently, he, as a political thinker, gives more priority to their linkage. Accordingly, in contrast with Weber, he considered sociology a science that is not value-free but one that is partly factual and partly evaluative, although, and this is his point, never both at the same time (AM HAS MS 5116/12: 6).⁴

Let us return to the above mentioned quotation. It continues as follows: "This methodological similarity suggests that among historical and sociological laws examined primarily by Dobretsberger it is the meaning-logical type that is the most significant for synoptical legal sociology" (Horváth 1934: 96; Dobretsberger 1931: 211-221). In fact, it is precisely Weberian *Verstehen* that Dobretsberger refers to and Horváth cites from him the following sentence: "We can only have a hypothesis about an action if we know the aims" (Horváth 1934: 96; Dobretsberger 1931: 218). However, Horváth also criticises Weber: "...ideal-typical construction allows prediction only from the meaning of the *Ought*. This does not, however, satisfy the synoptical method because even the anti-rational change of subjective meaning may be subject to laws" (Horváth 1934: 96). It can be seen that Horváth's aim was on the one hand to integrate Weber as a major component into his most significant and theoretical

innovation and on the other hand to transcend Weber. He considered Weber's efforts only a partial success because *Verstehen*, applying the idealtype of *Zweckrational* action, suggests that the cause of social action is that the actor considers something valid.

According to Horváth, however, the approach focusing on the causal reason why N. N. considers something valid is also a half-truth: "In our understanding, legal sociology conceptualises the functionality between the *Is* and the *Ought* reciprocally and not unilaterally in favour of the former but as a mutual one... It expects a lot from the sociology of knowledge because it also considers knowledge as something attached to existence. However, sociological existence itself can only be galvanised into life through meaningful relations. Inasmuch as the perceptible *Ought* is a function of the *Is*, the *Is* is also a function of the validity of the *Ought*" (Horváth 1934: 95). Accordingly, *synopsis* is nothing but two, reciprocally inverse paradigms: that is, Mannheimianism and Weberianism, and not their *synthesis* but the continuous correction and alternation of the two.

How does Bibó develop his master's semi-Weberianism: the *synopsis*? In one of his best works in legal philosophy from the pre-war period (1937) he, still as a scientist and not yet a publicist, deals with the most important theoretical problems of his later career and, simultaneously, of any "transitology" (Radnóti 1991): pre-legitimacy and the creation of legitimacy: "Owing to the continuous oscillation between norm and fact, legal force and nullity are always reconsidered. As neither the conformity nor the difference between norm and act mean any essential relation, they are always reconsiderable and reviewable. The reconsideration of »absolutely« irrevocable nullity and legal force situations settled »for ever«, ocuses our attention on the whole treasury of extreme legal situations: *revolution* on the one hand and its counterpart, the *renaissance of legitimacy* on the other. Thus, it is only a psychological state of affairs depending on experience that during such consecutive processes, be it at the second or the tenth occasion, there appears the feeling of infallibility (irrevocability). Fictitiousness does not mean that we should search for the origin of infallibility in logics; quite the contrary, it stems from irrational sources (and as such, in legal sociological terms it is more powerful than the whole construction of juridical logic!). It is fictitious only from the viewpoint of legal dogmatics and legal logics because, due to the strong tension between legal norm and act, it can be explained as fiction" (Bibó 1937:633-634).

In part, this text corroborates the observation of a Bibó-scholar: "In describing and interpreting social phenomena, Bibó always attempts to rely on the basic experience and spontaneous reactions of the members of society. Undoubtedly, this motive indicates a resemblance in Bibó's methodology to that of the Weberian *Verstehen*". However, this observation should be taken with some caution because Bibó's starting-point is not action but experience as his legal philosophical dissertation entitled "Force, Law, Freedom" (1986a: 5-149) shows, and this is not characteristic of Weber. Another key aspect of the above cited passage however points to an evident kinship between Bibó's and Weber's views, namely, that legitimacy resembles faith, public belief, and consensus in its character (Weber 1968). There are several instances that testify to this kinship in Bibó's writings (Litván-S. Varga 1995: 181-183; Bibó 1986c: 65), and the one I have chosen is embedded in an explicitly Weberian context: "As Max Weber pointed it out..." (Bibó 1990: 301). It can be found in the introductory part of Bibó's great treatise on international law: "In two great cultures, the Graeco-Roman and the Chinese, both rulers and ruled defined the nature of power. In both societies, those in power felt compelled to find a justification for their rule, in addition to merely exercising and administering that power, and consequently, the masses who endured,

supported or suspected the power elite were able to question it. Through this the idea of justifying power and of needing legitimacy for power became a decisive factor in these two cultures and a force which deeply affected other societies. Sometimes the ideas were used to justify the existing power, at other times to provoke mass risings and transform society through revolution" (Bibó 1976: 9-10, cf. Weber 1951). Bibó's definition of legitimacy also reflects Weber's influence: "The ultimate basis for a claim to legitimate power is a common conviction that those exercising power are in fact competent to do so. It then follows that the people accept that human attitudes, conditions and commands that are the products of power are, in fact, mandatory and reasonable: and also that the system of power distribution is right and practical. This common conviction is usually expressed in a few general and basic principles" (Bibó 1976: 10).

III.

Besides direct influence, Weber made an impact on Bibó not only through Horváth but Hajnal⁵ as well. Below, we shall demonstrate this intellectual relationship first in Bibó's essay on the Jewish question and later in his university lectures. In both cases, the central issue is rationality.

Among Bibó's writings, it is the second part of the *Jewish Question* that is the most sociologically conceived. In the chapter entitled *Jews and Anti-Semites*, which does not focus specifically on Hungary, Bibó analyses Jews' and non-Jews' interactions in a way very similar to Weberian *Verstehen*, that is, he examines the subjective meaning they ascribe to in-group and out-group actions (Weber 1968). These interactions (Bibó calls them experiences collected about each other) are investigated in three areas: (1) utilisation of social opportunities; (2) relation to social value systems; (3) traumas and compensations. In the case of social opportunities in mediaeval times the ultimate difference between Jews and non-Jews lay in the fact that the former were rational in their attitude, while non-Jews were traditional. Recast in a quasi-Weberian terminology one could say that when it came to seizing an opportunity the typical Jewish action was *Zweckrational* and non-Jews acted traditionally (Weber 1968). One is reminded of the same parallel as Bibó consciously turns to the means of idealtypical concept-building: "Thus, there developed among Jews an attitude pattern (eventually quite typical) which recognised every new, unexplored, or unnoticed economic or human opening, reacted with a state of constant readiness, quick rational adaptability, the »taking advantage« of new or newly recognized chances, and a conscious high regard for all forms of rational ones, those involving money or the management of money. This attitude pattern became a conditioned reflex, almost a socio-moral duty. This, of course, is not a Jewish invention, but one of the available and widespread methods of approaching human opportunities; it contrasts with the other method, that of handling opportunities in the traditional and usual manner, governed by the precept that people base their existence on certain habitual resources, methods, and forms and, even if they know of alternative possibilities, they are reluctant to exploit them. Actual practices are always located somewhere between these two approaches, because both totally unthinking traditionalism and wholly untested rationalism are unrealistic. The various behaviour patterns differ in how much they approach, or how they combine the two extreme methods" (Bibó 1991: 215-216).

The explanation given as to why this rational mentality became a typically Jewish characteristic hints again at a Weberian influence, although this time Bibó's interpretation of

Weber is not the most accurate: "This meant that they were limited to the margins of economic, existential, and human opportunities; the only way for them to survive and become established was to choose endeavours that were yielded to them or were spurned or unnoticed by society" (Bibó 1991: 215). It can be seen that Bibó's argumentation is based on the pariah status of the Jews (cf. Weber 1952), in other words: the moral contempt surrounding them and their consequent exclusion from society from the Middle Ages onwards.

Up to this point Bibó followed Weber. However, his field of interest is not the spirit of capitalism but antisemitism and this explains his wise scepticism towards the dominance of rational spirit: "By contrast, one trait of capitalism and the fledgling money-based economy of the modern period was specifically that it gradually made the rational handling of opportunities one of the basic principles of social and economic life. In the sphere of classical capitalism this took place entirely without the participation of the Jews, demonstrating that developments had nothing to do with Jewish traits but were prompted by social conditions that could have occurred under different circumstances as well. We must not forget, however, that even though we view capitalism as the fundamental principle of modern social organisation its power to transform the entire social organisation was fully developed only in America. When it comes to European work and lifestyle, many of the broad social layers—especially civil servants, craftsmen, some of the merchants, and small landholders—have merely acknowledged the new conditions, and adapted themselves to capitalism only to the extent that they used its means of distribution and mass-produced commodities. In all other respects, they continue to cultivate those forms of human existence that have been in force before the advent of capitalism" (Bibó 1991: 216).

This is no more Weber; this is Hajnal. It is he, Weber's strongly polemical adherent (Hajnal 1936; 1993), through whom Bibó, the equilibrist, corrects the Founding Father of German sociology. Other issues also show Bibó to take an intermediary position between Hajnal and Weber. In his interview given to Tibor Huszár⁶ he praises Hajnal for being able to recognise traits of intellectualism in technical activity and even in skilled physical labour. Moreover, Bibó seems to agree with Hajnal's criticism on Weber's Protestant Ethic, which was glorified by him in the thirties. Nevertheless, Bibó rejects Hajnal's senseless anti-rationalism, which motivated Hajnal in criticising Weber:

"B.- Hajnal's inspiration was very important because he wrote as if it was a programme that people shaping nature are doing an intellectually more valuable work than those administering things...That is, a craftsman who is almost an artist is more valuable than an office clerk...[...] Hajnal's terminology is extremely difficult to understand, complicated almost beyond belief and he also used many basic notions in unusual ways. For example, he considered rationalism evil. [...] In his opinion, the substance of rationalism was that represented by the army: rationally consistent, reasonable utilisation of opportunities for perhaps irrational, wicked purposes. [...]

H.- Is it correct to say that Hajnal is a key figure in the reception of Max Weber in Hungary?

B.- One can construct any kind of *Geistesgeschichte* from Weber... Well, it is very easy to make such a turn from what he has pointed out from the impact of Protestantism" (1989: 236-237).

Bibó's casual remark on the rationality of the army leads us to another imaginary debate within the Bibó-Weber-Hajnal triangle. In this case, Bibó's stance demonstrates well what a

great social scientist we lost in exchange for a moral genius. To realise this, we have to examine Bibó's lectures on sociology and political science. The latter, reflecting almost wholly Hajnal's sociologically inspired vision about history, also belongs rather to the realm of sociology; moreover, they are arguably among the best among the author's oeuvre (and they are still unpublished!).

In his sociological lectures, Bibó analyses the so-called simple command, which he classifies among social rules: "...The possibility of giving occasional commands is a very significant developmental step... In the most primitive communities...the father and the chief who may punish, severely punish or even kill members of the family and of the tribe may seem to be an absolute commander only for us because in fact there are very strict traditional rules that determine when, how and whom he may punish. In more sophisticated societies, however, certain commanding competences emerge: a certain social division of labour or distribution of powers gives some people the authority to give orders to others as they wish. It is through these discretionary commands that social rules began to change from traditionality to rationality. For a long, long time it comes to no one's mind that any powerful person or organ may change traditions inherited from the ancestors by a certain decision from one day to another. Giving orders is the only area in which the commander can change the commands emitted by him in the same natural way he issued them. It is only from the emergence of the absolute kingdom onwards that rules, in particular legal rules began to be interpreted as the rulers' personal commands and it is only from this time onwards that the discretionary modification of social rules, primarily legal rules, becomes usual. This opportunity was taken over from the absolute kingdom by the democratised power organs of society and that is how the public belief and public practice emerged that society [is mostly governed] not by rule originating and developed from ancient times but by rules made by competent organs, rational, reasonable rules that can be made and revoked the same way" (AM HAS MS 5116/12: II. 36-38).

Thus, rationality shows its positive side here: the *Entzauberung* of politics in the Weberian sense of the word. For Bibó, differently from Weber, it is clear that the only system qualified for this purpose is democracy, and this is based on the mature considerations of a theoretician, and not of a political writer, educator or therapist: "Democracy is a form of government in which the creation of state power and authority is not something beyond our reason and view but something clear and reasonable. In democracy people know that power is created through cooperation and consent" (AM HAS MS 5116/20: 9-10). Besides, Bibó drew the lesson from the other diametrical bias of Hajnal that rationality has a Jekyll and Hyde character. If it is only the *Zweckrationalität* of those in power that becomes manifest, the effect on society can only be irrationality.

One source of rationality resulting in irrationality can be the relation between society and the state: "This relation has two marginal cases: one in which society simply depends on the state is characterised by simple conquering power (blind discipline, despotism etc.). This kind of organisation is rational in a bad sense; here, this word means that the higher will needs not cope with any irrational resistance but it can command things" (AM HAS MS 5116/19: 24). "...At the same time when the conquering, imperative, rational state is omnipotent, it is unbearably hollow inside. The contribution of the individual in the functioning of the state is limited to the fulfilment of commands... If such a state goes through a crisis, it is overthrown quite easily..." (AM HAS MS 5116/19: 27). It is instructive to observe how Bibó views the achievements of the European economy and bureaucracy from a position between Weber and Hajnal- one of whom attributes these achievements to calculative rationality and the other to

the "irrational" professionalism of guilds: "The European organisation of the state... vigorously intervenes into the web of society and is able to exert its effects but the whole system is based on the refined detail work of the small units of society. The European state can make accurate accounts and reports not because it kept society under a strict discipline but because it was built on small units that had already constructed the methods of correctness, managerialism and professionalism for their own use. The state organisation was constructed to use the union, guild and other bureaucracies" (AM HAS MS 5116/19: 26).

The connection between the withdrawal of *Entzauberung* and the unlimited power of *Zweckrationalität* is based on a lack of the distribution of power as well: "Although Hitler came to power in a republic, it would be false to claim that he exerted his power in a rational state because the magical respect for the Führer was very important... Rough articulation was a very conspicuous feature of the Hitlerian state organisation... The difference here can be formulated as the contrast between merely *Zweckrational* states and states somehow deeply articulated by long-established customs. The Hitlerian state was a brutally *Zweckrational* state limited by no consideration (piety, humanity etc.). To find a similarly inarticulate state organisation one would have to go back to the Turkish and Tartarian states that were controlled by a rigid and *ad hoc* *Zweckrationalität* and each function is fitted to the *ad hoc* needs of an actual conquest, of the Party, of those in power etc..." (AM HAS MS 5116/20: 10-11).

IV.

To what extent is the comparison with Weber suitable to test Bibó's merit as a scientist? While compared to Ferrero, another great expert of legitimacy, Bibó's admiration for his late master from Geneva reminds us of Petöfi's idolatry toward Béranger (that is, when the original and talented Hungarian author adores his mediocre but better-known Western colleague), the case of Weber is the reverse. Here, the Hungarian Bibó "fans" may have the feeling of the underdeveloped: "we are late for everything". Unfortunately, history and Bibó's aspirations oriented him away from the course his abilities seemed to prescribe.

In one respect, the two authors are *both* late: they are the children of the 20th century, of course, not chronologically (1900-2000) but historically (1914-1989). Both Weber's (Somlai 1999) and Bibó's work was conceived in the framework of modernisation and rationalisation but post-modernity revised both narratives and exceeded both agendas. This can be a challenging state of affairs for the guardians of Bibó's heritage because it demonstrates an increasing outdatedness that is the logical result of a natural process and not of an unwillingness to face our past.

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2. ISTVÁN BIBÓ (1911-1979), political scientist;...doctor's degree University of Law, Szeged, 1934; postgrad. University of Vienna, 1933-34, Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 1934-35; scholar International Law Academy, The Hague, 1936... Called to bar, 1940; official Hungarian Ministry of Justice, 1938-45; chief of department Ministry Interior, 1945-46; lecturer Szeged University, 1940; professor Political Science, 1946-50; deputy President Eastern European Research Institute, Budapest, 1947-49; librarian Budapest University, 1951-57; minister state, 1956; imprisoned, 1957-63; librarian Central Statistical Office, 1963-71. Member Hungarian Academy of Science, 1946-49. Author: A szankciók kérdése a nemzetközi jogban [The Issue of Sanctions in International Law], 1934; Kényszer, jog, szabadság [Force, Law, Freedom], 1935; A magyar demokrácia válsága [The Crisis of Hungarian Democracy], 1945; A keleteurópai kisépek nyomorúsága [The Misery of Small Peoples in Eastern Europe], 1946; Zsidókérdés Magyarországon, 1948 [The Jewish Question in Hungary]; The Case of Hungary and the World Situation, 1957; The Paralysis of International Institutions and the Remedies, 1976...(Who's Who in the World 1978-79). Bibó's other publications: see References below.

3. BARNA HORVÁTH (1896-1973) Dr. Iuris (Budapest 1920), Bar examination (Budapest 1923), Venia Legendi (Diploma Habilitationis) Philosophy of Law (Szeged 1925), Ethics (Budapest 1926), Professor of Philosophy of Law (Szeged 1929), Kolozsvár (1940); Member, Hungarian Academy of Science (1945). Visiting Professor, The New School for Social Research, Graduate Faculty (New York 1950) [Horváth 1968:35]. His prior publications include inter alia: Rechtssoziologie: Probleme der Gesellschaftslehre und der Geschichtslehre des Rechts (1934); Der Rechtsstreit des Genius: Socrates, Johanna (1942); English Theory of Law (in Hungarian, 1943); The Examination of Public Opinion (1942)...[Horváth 1952:243].

4. AM HAS. Archive of Manuscripts, Hungarian Academy of Science

5. ISTVÁN HAJNAL (1892-1956): Doctorate Degree in History (Budapest 1914), Diploma Habilitationis in History (Budapest 1921), Professor of Modern Universal History (Budapest

1930-1950), Member, Hungarian Academy of Science (1928-1950). Author: *Le role sociale de l'écriture et l'évolution Européenne* (1934), *Az újkor története* [History of the Modern Age] (1936), *Történelem és szociológia* [History and Sociology] (1939), *Vergleichende Schriftproben zur Entwicklung und Verbreitung der Schrift im 12-13. Jahrhundert* (1943), *Über die Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Geschichtsschreibung kleinen Nationen* (1944), *Universities and the Development of Writing in the 12th-13th centuries* (1954), *A propos de l'enseignement de l'écriture aux universités médiévales* (1957). See Lakatos 1996.

6. Tibor Huszár (1930-): Hungarian sociologist, former director of the Sociology Department at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest.