Which Duality? Why Dual? ¹
On the Gains and Losses of Hungarian Sociology’s Dual-society Theories

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ABSTRACT: Hungarian sociology is abundant in dual-society and dual-structure theories. In most cases the mentioned duality is not the same. In my paper – to answer the question of which duality? – I compile a catalogue of Hungarian sociology’s dual-structure and -society theories. As a follow-up step – this time while trying to answer the Why dual? question – I associate Hungarian sociology’s dual-society images with Hungarian society’s East-Central European semi-Peripheral status. I propose that the semi-periphery of the capitalist world-system as a historically formed mode of existence is not evadable in its effects and lays the tendencies out for the cognition of this mode of existence. As a structural constraint it conditions Hungarian sociology to “recognize” the dualities of the social-structure. Finally, I argue for going beyond these duplicating strategies.

Hungarian sociology is abundant in dual-society and dual-structure theories. The image of a “divided”, “split in half” society is just as widespread in domestic public-political discourse. If the perception of duality in society and social-structure has proved to be so tenacious, then it deserves a critical revision.

In the case of sociological concepts, the question is likely to arise: wherein exactly does the postulated duality lie? This is where difficulties emerge. A more detailed analysis makes it clear that in most cases the mentioned duality is not the same. If we conclude that the alleged dual structure of our society could as well mean – in reality – several different dualities, then we may ask: which duality is it exactly?

The next question would be whether the idea of a dual society is maintainable if it may mean multiple separate dualities? What relations are revealed or obscured by such distinctions? From where do these originate? Where are the roots? Is it the subject examined that is dual (if so, in what way?) or is the duality in the eye of the contemplator? If in fact it is the latter, then what exactly causes this duality? Is the intention to align with historical conventions (Ferenc Erdei’s model)? Or is it some a priori tendency of cognition or modelling of society?

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In my paper – to answer the question of which duality? – I compile a catalogue of Hungarian sociology’s dual-structure and -society theories. After analysing Ferenc Erdei’s theory on the social structure of the interwar period – perceived (falsely) as a dual-society theory – I present newer theories from both the pre- and post-socialist era, while taking a look at the sociological basis of the popular discourse of the bipolar political division thesis. This detour offers surprising further gains: to some extent it helps our understanding of the prevalence and popularity of Erdei’s concept.

As a follow-up step – this time while trying to answer the Why dual? question – I associate Hungarian sociology’s dual-society images with Hungarian society’s East-Central European semi-peripheral status. I propose that the semi-periphery of the capitalist world-system as a historically formed mode of existence is not evadable in its effects and lays the tendencies out for the cognition of this mode of existence. I also claim that the East-Central European semi-peripheral mode of existence as a structural constraint conditions Hungarian sociology to “recognize” the dualities of the social-structure. It forces Hungarian sociology to dissolve the empirical deviations of Hungarian society from the “model-society” with a society-duplicating cognitive strategy. Finally, I argue for going beyond these duplicating strategies.

Which duality? From Erdei to the second economy

Erdei Ferenc’s work on the Hungarian society of the interwar period is probably the most important prototype and reference for sociological dual-society theories. Despite the strong temptation, it cannot be left out of consideration that the duality of the historico-national and the modern-bourgeois society does not encompass the whole of society. Nowhere does Erdei actually write about a “dual” structure or society. What he does mention, however, are the following: “multiple complex structures”, “ensemble” of multiple structures, joint but “discrete structures”, “self-sufficient social formations next to each other”, “labyrinthine social-structure”, “endless line of transient social forms”, “diverse forms”, “different social and cultural forms” (see: Erdei 1976a: 25). Erdei unambiguously implies that under (and partly beside) the alleged dual social-structure there is a third one, the peasant-society alias historic-folk society. If we only emphasize the upper two structures, a categorical distinction and opposition is questionable.

To quote Erdei: “The upper most and ruling social-structure is the historico-national society that evolved and modernized as the continuation of the feudal noble society. This assumes the same positions of production and the same roles as it did in the feudal society, only now adjusting to the production mode of capitalism. Underneath lies the social-structure of the somewhat modernized historic-folk society as a continuation of the villeinage of the feudal society and the folk society below all states – all more or less adopting the production mode of capitalism. Beside these historical structures, capitalism’s own structure formed in Hungarian society’s modern-bourgeois society, which is just one component of the era’s Hungarian society in the roles and production positions of industry, the trading of goods and modern city-intellectual life” (Erdei 1976a: 25 – emphasis added). The 2010/4 issue of Szociológiai Szemle publishes the fourth part of Erdei’s work on historic-folk society – found by Károly Halmos (Erdei 2010; Halmos 2010).
The rather prolific Erdei wrote this paper around 1943–44, but he himself never published it. The script that had turned up from the bequest was only published five years after Erdei’s death by Tibor Huszár in 1976 (Huszár 1976, 2003). Why Erdei did not publish his paper remains unknown up to this day. There are several interpretations. According to one of the typical opinions, Erdei stood by his concept, but thought the script to be lost (see for example Huszár 1976). According to another standpoint, he no longer took responsibility for the concept (opinions vary as to why). As for the empirical validity of the manuscript, interpreters can be split into two opposing camps. According to the one, the script is an authentic and valid depiction of interwar society. The other view – which has a different opinion also on why the paper remained a manuscript – states that the author’s political ambitions and the morale of the early forties left its mark on the 1943–44 paper. Accordingly, Erdei sketched the image of the dual-structure through the genteel–non genteel, gentry–bourgeois, Christian–Jewish dichotomies. These distinctions – though nonetheless very significant in the era – would not necessarily, in a professional, scientific study, justify the structural duplication of society (Nagy 1993 [1986]; Gyáni 1997, 2001; Bognár 2011 [2003], 2010).

Although György Konrád and Iván Szelényi refer to it in their 1971 paper (Konrád–Szelényi 1974 [1971]), ‘Social conflicts of under-urbanization’, in post-war domestic social-science the first who explicitly mentions the “dual-nature of social-structure” is Tamás Kolosi (Kolosi 1974: 155). However, the rough distinction of Konrád and Szelényi, later conceptualized by Kolosi, does not resemble Erdei’s concept. No wonder: Erdei’s idea could not have inspired either Konrád and Szelényi or Kolosi, since at that time Erdei’s concept had not yet been discovered. Kolosi’s observation concerning the dual-structure has nothing to do with national- and bourgeois-societies. His writings arose out of the reform processes and political-economic measures of the Sixties, in particular the economic and social structural developments resulting from the introduction of the ‘New Economic Mechanism’. He points out, that beside the redistributive mechanism – disposing over excess goods produced socially –, economical reforms created and strengthened another sphere of production, in which goods produced outside socially organized production are distributed (Kolosi 1975: 155–163). These phenomena, later labelled “second economy” by István R. Gábor and Péter Galasi5 was then further developed by Elemér Hankiss in the early eighties – albeit still with quotation and question marks – as “second society”. In the late eighties, from the pen

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4 This disagreement was partially the intellectual stake of the dispute between Gábor Gyáni and Viktor Karády in Budapesti Könyvszemle (Bksz) (Gyáni 1997, 1998; Karády 1998).

5 Gábor–Galasi 1981: cf. Kolosi (2003). For the overview of the vast literature on second economy, see Sik 1996. The division of economy to primary and secondary (shadow) was later attached to the formal–informal distinction, which came from the fallacy that – in János Kornai’s (1983) terms – the bureaucratic coordinated primary economy is formal and the quasi-market coordinated secondary economy is informal. For a detailed critique of this view, see József Böröcz’s works (Böröcz 1990, 1993, 2000; Böröcz–Southworth 1998).
of Szelényi and his associates, as well as Kolosi, come the double-triangle and L-models – canonized in sociology curricula for more than two decades – that were to describe the dual social-structure of late state socialism (Szelényi–Manchin 1987; Szelényi 1986–87, Szelényi 1988; Kolosi 1987: 89–120; cf. Andorka 2006: 185–186).

Although Tamás Kolosi and Iván Szelényi refer to and depend on Erdei’s model in the eighties, the parallels in the social structure of the interwar period and that of the eighties the differences are much more apparent. The first economy’s redistributive and the second economy’s quasi-market sectors can scarcely be deduced from the national- and bourgeois-societies. With his thesis of ‘interrupted embourgeoisement’ Szelényi does not state that (in the individual history and genealogy) Erdei’s bourgeois society reappears in the form of the socialist entrepreneur; he rather mentions the embourgeoisement of Erdei’s peasant-society (Szelényi 1988). Be that as it, the alleged dualities of the interwar society and that of the eighties are nowhere near the same duality.

The research of the seventies and eighties errs not only by accepting Erdei’s analysis with little reflection on it⁶, but it also misunderstands Erdei by consequently perceiving his depiction of society as the theory of dual-structure (Kolosi 1987: 90–92; Szelényi 1988: 67–70; cf.: Andorka 2006: 176).⁷ Iván Szelényi interprets the developments of the seventies and eighties as a ‘return’ to the ‘normal’ state of the interwar period. As he puts it:

...the most striking development is the resurgence of the ‘second hierarchy’ [...]. Social structure seems to be returning to its ‘normal’ state: the second, market-based, burgher hierarchy which was temporarily forced into the dominant rank order regains its relative autonomy, although it remains more subordinated then it was before 1945 (Szelényi 1988: 71 – emphasis added).

While, among others, Tamás Kolosi and Iván Szelényi date the formation of Hungarian society’s dual-structure and the strengthening of the second economy from the sixties, István Kemény, representing the older researcher generation, sees a completely opposite tendency. According to him, “only with the economic reforms of sixty-three did the merger of the two structures start, because the rigid partition wall between the two Hungaries – the communist and the other – fell” (Kemény 1992a: 291 – emphasis added). István Kemény states that “...neither Rákosi’s terror, nor the Kádár-system’s retaliations could break the antecedent social-structure. [...] They only built their structures on it” (Kemény 1992a: 291). In his observation ”...there are two structures beside each other: a purely communist

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⁶ Tamás Kolosi’s interpretation of Erdei is the least critical (Kolosi 1987: 90–92). Iván Szelényi has a more subtle view on Erdei’s oeuvre (Szelényi 1988: 58–63), but is just as accepting of his conclusions as Kolosi.

⁷ See footnote 2.
structure that is logically built or rather copied, and a more complex and subtle one that developed over centuries. And these two societies coexisted” (Kemény 1992a: 291). While according to others, society duplicated because of the economic reforms of the sixties, Kemény claims that the strengthening of the second economy is what makes a merger possible. Erdei, Kemény, Szélényi (and Kolosi) all talk of a dual-society – all in a different sense.

Duplicating views of society after the system change

The question arises, whether the duality of Hungarian social-structure in the distinction of redistribution and (quasi)market is valid not only before the system change or also after it? In other words: is this kind of social-structure only possible in the case of socialist economies or also of in capitalist formations?

In a thought experiment, Iván Szélényi claimed that capitalist systems that are linked primarily to market-integrated welfare state can also create dual economic structures if beside the capital-based mode of production they also establish a state-dominated one (Szélényi 1981, 1990: 449–469., cf. Szélényi 1978; Szélényi–Manchin 1987). It is important to stress that Szélényi never explicitly states that a dual-society can be seen in capitalist systems, unlike Tamás Kolosi, who claims that there is a ‘high probability’ for the dual-structure scheme to be true for the post-system-change social-structure. It is worth quoting his explanation precisely:

…in Hungary – and to a lesser extent in other Eastern European post-socialist countries – a distinctive duality of a redistributive and a market type social structure already came about in the socialist era, becoming part of common knowledge in social sciences under the name of the L-model and the ‘dual pyramid theory’. It is highly plausible that the same duality describes modern capitalism, because, in opposition to the classical capitalism of the nineteenth century, in modern capitalism redistribution has an indisputable structure forming role (Kolosi–Sági 1996: 159, Kolosi 2000: 33 – emphasis added).

According to him then, the fact that social structure is generally dual in modern capitalism and specifically post-system-change Hungarian society is the result of the effects of two structuring mechanisms (market and redistribution). In Tamás

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8 István Kemény takes his view partly from Gyula Tellér. He thinks that it was Tellér in the seventies, who – together with Ferenc Donáth, Zoltán Zille and Pál Juhasz – can be considered the first to formulate the concept of dual economy and society (Kemény 1992b, 2010: 130–132, 154–155).

9 To quote Kolosi, from a 1991 interview: “My – maybe a bit opinionated – assumption is that on the level of large theoretical models, what I have written on social structure in Hungary will be true for a long time. [...] Nothing has changed in the fundamental structural processes in Hungary; the dual social-structure model – with the particular mixture of redistributive and market mechanisms – is absolutely virulent today, meaning that it is still applicable” (Kolosi 1991: 111).

10 If we build on Karl Polányi’s economic-integration mechanisms (Polányi 1957), then why is the third scheme, reciprocity, consistently being disregarded? – asks József Böröcz (1990, 2000). The simplifying opposition of redistribution versus market, bureaucratic versus market coordination generously ignores the varying forms of reciprocity, like a clan and client-system, favoritism, nepotism, fixing, swindling, corruption and other relations based on mutual assistance (see for example: Czakó–Sik
Kolosi’s view the L-model is continues to be valid – adding that the ratio of the two structuring mechanisms has shifted: since 1990 the role of state redistribution has became secondary to market integration (Kolosi–Sági 1996: 159–160; Kolosi 2000: 33–48). The fact that the analysis of the post-system-change social structure is done with the conceptual tool of market elite versus redistributive elite is very reflective of the idea (Kolosi–Sági 1996; Kolosi 2000).


Júlia Szalai’s work on the social-political institutional structure also fits this discourse (Szalai 2007). In her book, titled Aren’t there two countries...? (Nincs két ország...?) she foreshadows an affirmative answer. According to her, the rupture between the two societies runs between the poor (more precisely the “indigent”) and non-poor in the struggle over redistributive sources. The parallel enforcement of the indigence- and contribution-principal in state redistribution creates and supports a dual structure. Whoever finds work in the labour-market – according to the contribution-principal – is granted a broader access of redistributive sources, contrary to those who are excluded from the labour-market and can only access (scarce) benefits on the grounds of indigence.

Erzsébet Szalai sees a duality in post-system-change in Hungary that is unlike anything else (Szalai 2001). As she states: “A Western, market-connected, foreign-dominated, concentrated ownership and institutional structure is up against a domestic-market-dependent, diffuse structure with a feudal and paternalistic production-management model and a lifestyle based on it” (Szalai 2001: 240, see also: Szalai–Krausz–Szigeti 2002). This opposition is referred to, in brief, as multi-national (or Western) and domestic (feudal) spheres. Erzsébet Szalai proposes her dual-society concept by the sweeping generalization of the foreign- and domestic-owned “dual economy” concept (cf.: Bartha 2003).

An approach intersecting all others is that of Béla Pokol. He does not set forth his concept by the opposition in Hungarian or East-Central European societies’ dual structure, but by the opposition of two types of social-structure theories. Just as Ralf Dahrendorf differentiates between integration- and coercion-theories (Dahrendorf 1959 [1957]: 157–165), or rather how Gerhard Lenski talks of conflict-theory based and functionalist (consensus-theory) stratification-theories (Lenski 1984 [1966]: 14–23, 441–443), for Béla Pokol (2004b), the “dual structure of society” means that we have to make a distinction between the views that concentrate on the functional differentiation of society or institutional structure

1987; Sik 2001, 2002, 2010). The colorful expressions indicate the many forms of reciprocal networks to be found. According to the above analysis, these could form a ‘third’ society.
and those that focus on the structure of social rule or the hierarchically organized social macro groups’ struggle for power (Pokol 2004a: 138–150, 390–391, 404–418, 2004b).

In many ways, Zsuzsa Ferge uses similar conceptual distinctions in her newest book (Ferge 2010). In connection with the concept of David Lockwood’s system integration and social integration (Lockwood 1956, 1964) and with Jürgen Habermas’ system and lifeworld (1987 [1981]) concepts, Ferge analyses the change in Hungarian society’s system structure and social structure after 1989. It is clear that Zsuzsa Ferge does not talk of two distinct structures, instead she simply uses two analytical standpoints, while – just like Béla Pokol – she does not try to avoid the term “dual structure” (see for example Ferge 2010: 22).

While all authors discussed here talk of “the” society’s dual structure, they all seem to discover a different duality. Before we resume our interpretation, let us see if the widespread thesis of society’s political divide can be empirically validated.

**Political division after the system change**

At the end of the eighties, the developing political pluralism and multi-party system brought to the surface a variant of the folk–urban opposition (Heller–Rényi 1995). This opposition now takes shape in the bloc-formation of the party-structure: polarization can be observed in both the right–left and the conservative–liberal dimensions, in addition, the coupling of the two parameters – what Blau terms consolidation – had intensified (Angelusz–Tardos 2005: 65–93; Fábián 2005: 219–230; cf. Angelusz–Tardos 2003). The press oriented towards public life and politics has in many ways undergone a parallel differentiation. Of the daily papers, preferring *Magyar Hírlap* or *Magyar Nemzet* over *Népszabadság* and *Népszava* – despite their differences – is a definite ideological stance, just like – out of the weekly papers – favouring *Heti Válasz*, *Demokrata*, *Magyar Fórum* or *Barikád* instead of *Magyar Narancs*, *Élet és Irodalom*, 168 óra or *HVG*. This peculiar separation is similarly way prevalent in the online media, even if we leave internet forums and blogs outs of consideration. Just as the political commitment of *Echo* and *Hír TV* is obvious, there is also no doubt about the standpoint of *ATV* or that of *Nap TV* (until 2009). The political logic of the smaller *Lánchíd Rádió* and opposing *Klub Rádió* led to the replacement of *Danubius* and *Sláger Rádio* by *Class FM* and *Neo FM*, two radios that fit better into the political scheme. What does this suggest?

If we accept that in everyday thinking the information obtainable on socio-political reality is pre-selected and pre-interpreted for the individual, then the source of the information becomes very significant. Furthermore, if it is also true that the individual’s view of the socio-political reality is not only built on the mass media

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11 Against this backdrop, it is not surprising, that the parliament elected in 2010 passed a new law (2010/CLXXXV.) on ‘media-services and mass-media’ that bears the same division in terms of which newspapers and media do and do not protest against the statutory media regulation.
but also on the information obtained through the network of personal relationships, then the role of informal relationships, and especially that of opinion-leaders, has a great effect on political and public life identity. If we also suppose that in Hungary the most influential factor in personal-informal relationships is public-political identity, party-bloc affiliation and political party preference – confirmed by the empirical research of Róbert Angelusz and Róbert Tardos (Angelusz–Tardos 2005: 118–120) – then this tendency toward political homophily must have severe consequences for society’s (political) differentiation. As Róbert Angelusz and Róbert Tardos state: “we talk of a bloc-like crystallization of informal contacts of the voters, which contributes to the forming of large blocs of voters and a pregnant political rupture” (Angelusz–Tardos 2005: 145).

The political reorganization of the past few years has somewhat redefined the system of political ruptures, but the ideological-political polarization and the tendency of political homophily – in other words those with a similar political mindset seek each other’s company, while interaction density between people from different political-world-view blocs decreases – is stronger than ever according to their later studies (Angelusz–Tardos 2010).

With the partial media coverage of the ever-polarizing public life, the strong bonds (family, relatives and friends) supported by institutional networks (for example, church-religious, civic and trade-union affiliations) are so intensely determined by the bloc-affiliation, that it is not unreasonable to talk of a ‘political divide’. Even if this expression has become devalued because of its political usage and even if it means a three-way instead of a two-way division (because of the 30–35% of politically inactive voters), and even if it can be shown that the traditional variables of social structure (access to economic and cultural resources) cannot adequately explain the political ruptures and their explicative power is decreasing, we can still talk of a political divide (Angelusz–Tardos 2005: 93; Fábián 2005: 208, 229).

The dual theories of social science are not too common in every-day, public-political discourse. In contrast, the discourse of political divide is quite strong, which has a huge effect – as Róbert Angelusz and Róbert Tardos show – on the development and cultivation of social connections and the character of interactions. As the Thomas theorem states: “if men define situations as real” – for example, the fundamental division of political and public life – then “they are real in their consequences” (Thomas 1966 [1931]: 301, cited by: Némedi 2005: 463, 477).

All this sheds light on the reception of Erdei. Erdei’s “dual society” concept is so popular in social science circles possibly because both sides are able to define their own position and that of the opposing camp based on it. The right-wing conservative and the left-liberal poles can both project their identities and the picture they have constructed of their opposition on to the interwar period, and also legitimize it with Erdei’s authority. In a superficial reading, the duality of the histori-
co-national and modern-bourgeois societies seemingly justifies the last two-three decades’ story of political division, and embeds it into history. Even the emergence of new sources that are ruining the dual structure theory cannot worsen the possibility of Erdei’s ‘ever-actualization’ (Erdei 2010; Halmos 2010). More so, if the apathy of the apolitical silent masses under the political division can be (mis)interpreted as our age’s folk society. The substitution lends itself, because the masses that turn away from politics are there. András Lányi’s warning is relevant: “Do not forget, it is not the country that is divided – it is no longer in that state – only those who talk on behalf of others: the public actors and their audience. The rest is silence” (Lányi 2009: 113).

Why dual?

The causes of the sociological and every-day popularity and hardiness of these dual society views can only be – in my opinion – revealed, if we indeed look at the historical tendencies of Hungarian society’s formation from a macro-sociological perspective. First of all, we have to take into account that traditionally it is a luxury of social structure research only in classically closed state-socialist societies and in capitalist core countries to look for the main structuring mechanisms solely from within their own nation-state societies. In the case of a small, open capitalist economy (and a society built on it) – in a semi-periphery status like Hungary’s – the position it has in world-economy cannot be disregarded. Only those stratification-researchers can settle for the container model of society and the underlying methodological nationalism (Wimmer–Glick Schiller 2002), who – based on Tamás Kolosi’s distinction (1987: 27–33) – undertake only on the description of the given population’s lay-out (stratification) and not the factors that shape the social structure.

Nation-states on the semi-periphery and periphery of the world-economy develop unevenly (see for example, Szigeti 2010). The social forms represented as dual society on this basis become the ideal-typical opposition of ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ segments. Erdei’s modern-bourgeois society, Iván Szelényi’s small agricultural commodity producers and socialist entrepreneurs, Kolosi’s quasi-market actors, Kemény’s non-communist structure and Erzsébet Szalai’s multinational sector are similar – despite their several differences – in the sense that these social formations are closer to the capitalist world-system’s (Western) core in their organization and lifestyle. A good demonstration of this is the counter-pole, as it is interpreted to be a feudal, rank-ordered (late, backward, underdeveloped) social organization by all of them.13

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12 According to Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-system-theory, the capitalist world-system came into being in the long XVI. century in Western Europe. The geographic division of labor within the system causes differentiation and the world-system becomes hierarchic. The leading economic activities, in a socio-economic sense, concentrate in the core(s) of the system, which – because of the unequal exchanges – is (are) surrounded by ‘less developed’ peripheral areas. The semi-periphery, like East-Central Europe with Hungary in it, occupies an intermediate position – with all its circumstances, that cannot be addressed here (Wallerstein 2004; Arrighi–Drangel 1986; Arrighi 1990; Böröcz 1992; Melegh 2009; Radice 2009; Szigeti 2010).

13 The theoretical typologies of Béla Pokol and Zsuzsa Ferge – who are interpreting a theoretical duality as a real structural one – do not, while Júlia Szalai’s distinction only partly fits into this explanatory scheme.
In addition, the *judgment* on Western, more developed, modern structure (in short: core) and the feudal, underdeveloped, lagging society (in short: periphery) is diametrically opposed in several concepts. While the core seems to be ranked higher and more desirable by most, the underdeveloped periphery is in turn labelled lower-ranked and obsolete. This evaluation clearly coincides with the capitalist world-system’s cultural-ideological mapping: the opposition of the concepts of “civilization” and “culture” (Elias 1998 [1939]; Wessely 1996) and the discursive order of the East–West slope (Melegh 2006, 2009). Despite the fact that Hungarian society’s place in the capitalist world-system was not taken into account in the dual society concepts, the cognitive scheme based on these did appear in their interpretation of reality.

A good demonstration of this duplicating cognition method is Tibor Kuczi’s analysis. In his view, the researchers from the societies of the world-economy’s (semi)periphery are trying to define and explain why their own society is not model-like, using concepts developed for the Western, core capitalist countries’ idealized circumstances. (They rely on the scientific literature by Anglo-Saxon, French and German structure- and stratification-researchers.) What could they possibly do, if the model-society reflected in the cognitive methods is dissolving into the analyzed Central-European reality, and won’t describe it properly? Tibor Kuczi claims that when this happens they resort to the cognitive strategy of duplication:

Some of the sociologists of the societies-to-be tried to overcome the problem by dividing the human world they lived in into a traditional, pre-social world and one in which procedures and human behaviour can be understood with the rules of the model-society. They postulated that they are dealing with a dual society. This metaphor can cause a lot of problems in the interpretation, because there are no two societies divided by some border, rather it is the application of two different theoretical concepts to the same subject. The concept of dual society is misleading, because it applies an abstract and a concrete spatial metaphor at the same time. Modern society is not alongside the traditional one, since the former has no spatial reference (Kuczi 1998: 50).

When the reality of societies of the (semi)periphery does not fit smoothly into the models, theoretic schemes and approaches developed for the interpretation and explanation of the relations of the core-capital countries, then researchers often resort to the method of *duplication*. One of Erdei’s sentences is a good illustration of this: “So these are capitalist class societies too, though not real and pure bourgeois social structures, but feudal historical or unhistorical bourgeois formations” (Erdei 1976a: 24). The result is the seemingly empirically validated idea of the dual society.
On the gains and losses of Hungarian sociology’s dual-society theories

In my paper, I am not saying that Hungarian society’s structure is unified and that no ruptures, brakes, superposed structures or differing institution- and relation-organizing principles can be observed. On the contrary: in my opinion, the approach of Hungarian society’s *multiple dualities* is just as convincing as the consistent denial of “the” duality. It is all so complex that it cannot be condensed into a single duality. Out of the entire complex society a duality thought to be fundamental can always be emphasized – this being useful for Hungarian sociology to draw attention to a supposed rupture. Altogether, the view of “the” duality can only originate from the *overgeneralization* and unjustified *overemphasis* of a partial duality and finally the duplication of society. Of course, there could be other methods to correct the maladjustment of the normative view and the ‘examined subject’ – falling short of expectations – with, on the one hand maintaining the ideal of the model society and the *orientalization* of their own society, on the other hand, the rejection of the model society and – at the same time – the rejection of Western sciences altogether. This is altogether a *regression* into national science (thought to be authentic) and scientific autarchy.

As a structural constraint, the East-Central European semi-periphery position conditions Hungarian sociology to “recognize” this duality. The structure of Hungarian society can only be seen (be made to seen) as dual, because both the real processes (the semi-periphery position) and the cognitive apparatus make the examiner susceptible to it. Beside the *orientalising* and the *regressive* cognitive strategies, the duplicating method is the most defensible and acceptable one – but we do not have to be content with it. East-Central European sociology’s cognitive chances are given: the chance to go beyond this *duplicating* strategy is still before us.

Hungarian social science provides several examples to follow. Iván Szelényi and his colleagues drew a rather convincing picture of the structure of Central European society of the mid-nineties (and of Hungary within this) in their book, *Making Capitalism without Capitalists*. They maintain the perspective of sociological understanding without giving up the possibility of a critical interpretation of society (Eyal–Szelényi–Townsley 1998). They give an example of how to construct an image of the organization of social-space, the formation of elite groups and classes and the struggle for limited resources while avoiding the society duplicating strategy. Róbert Tardos’s work can also serve as an important example, which – as a continuation of the pre-system-change cultural-interactional stratification model started by Róbert Angelusz and Róbert Tardos – builds a structure model by combining social network analysis, profession distribution survey and milieu-theory (Angelusz–Tardos 1991; Tardos 2008). Both depictions of social structure prove that the strategy of society duplication can be avoided even if we try to find
a way to describe social relations focusing on power and even if we try to disclose the organizational patterns of social relationships.

References


